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An architecture for detecting fissile materials and nuclear weapons in cargo shipments

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
Sector Vice-President & Chief Technology Officer
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Current Situation


- Active interrogation techniques (e.g., high-energy neutron beams, etc.) can operate with short dwell times, but are likely to be unacceptable with the public
- Passive interrogation techniques perform poorly with short dwell times
- Any method must be one that does not slow down commerce; at most, ~1 minute per scan
- We have developed architectures (for air and sea shipping channels) where passive interrogation can be employed, but **also** provide long inherent dwell times

The 3 insertion points

Sea transport




Air transport



ODIS = Offshore Detection Integrated System

Obtaining long dwell time at sea

- 3 or 4 sensors temporarily affixed on each cargo container at the port of embarkation
- Containers loaded and stowed on ship, creating an array that multiplies sensor detection capability and provides redundancy
- Radiation data securely relayed for duration of trip to a U.S. homeland Control Center, which merges the data with all other intelligence data, supports decision-making
- Provides time to decide – no split-second judgments required
- Detectors removed at port of debarkation, recertified, and distributed by air to foreign loading ports – not easily tampered with
- Life-cycle costs ~\$150 container trip



Obtaining long dwell-times for air cargo

- Radiation sensors are temporarily attached to the containers or pallet netting in an airport cargo facility during pre-loading
 - 3 sensors per pallet with 2 to 4 hour dwell time
 - Larger, higher-gain sensors than seaODIS
 - Sensor data is transmitted to airport center encrypted, and relayed to a CONUS Center for threat detection and action
- Cargo handlers attach, remove and return sensors to the docking cart
- Life-cycle costs ~ \$10 - \$20 / pallet
- CONOPS designed to work within existing work-flow

Deterrence for the air cargo channel

sensors can hang from cargo nets



Summary

- Nuclear transport modeling / sensor design shows that dwell-time in fact does solve the problem
- Could detect (and enable interdiction at-sea) of nuclear materials and weapons in sea cargo containers
 - Inherently addresses the detonation-on-detection and the “hot-potato” problems
 - Allows time to make informed, deliberate decisions
- Can be applied to air pallets, obtaining reasonable dwell times, and thereby, improved sensor performance
- Complements other elements of a multi-source container management system, and fits into layered defense
- At scale, cost per-container or per-palette is modest
 - Based on modeling of the system at scale: number of sensors, and the management of the sensor re-use cycle, etc.
- Excellent false-positive rates
- Incrementally deployable, upgradeable on the fly